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Engaging BuddhismWhy It Matters to Philosophy$

Jay L. Garfield

Print publication date: 2015

Print ISBN-13: 9780190204334

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2015

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190204334.001.0001

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(p.337) References

Source:
Engaging Buddhism
Publisher:
Oxford University Press

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