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The Brute WithinAppetitive Desire in Plato and Aristotle$
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Hendrik Lorenz

Print publication date: 2006

Print ISBN-13: 9780199290635

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2006

DOI: 10.1093/0199290636.001.0001

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Below Belief and Reason

Below Belief and Reason

Chapter:
(p.95) 7 Below Belief and Reason
Source:
The Brute Within
Author(s):

Hendrik Lorenz (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0199290636.003.0010

Plato’s Timaeus denies appetite the capacity for belief and yet presupposes that appetite can give rise to action, and that it can receive commands and information from the rational part of the soul. The chapter explains these features of Plato’s theory in terms of a high-powered conception of belief, and of a rich conception of non-rational cognition centered on the senses. In doing so, it introduces two closely related and relevant passages from another late Platonic dialogue, the Philebus.

Keywords:   Plato, Timaeus, Philebus, appetite, belief

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