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Knowledge and Practical Interests$
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Jason Stanley

Print publication date: 2005

Print ISBN-13: 9780199288038

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2006

DOI: 10.1093/0199288038.001.0001

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Interest‐Relative Invariantism versus Contextualism

Interest‐Relative Invariantism versus Contextualism

(p.105) 6 Interest‐Relative Invariantism versus Contextualism
Knowledge and Practical Interests

Jason Stanley (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

This chapter is devoted to a thorough-going comparison of Interest-Relativism Invariantism and contextualism. It argues that the contextualist is committed to a worse error-theory than the advocate of Interest-Relativism Invariantism. It concludes by arguing that neither contextualism nor Interest-Relative Invariantism helps with the problem of skepticism.

Keywords:   skepticism, counterfactuals, David Lewis, contextualism, Interest-Relative Invariantism

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