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Models, Truth, and Realism
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Models, Truth, and Realism

Barry Taylor

Abstract

This book mounts an argument against one of the fundamental tenets of much contemporary philosophy, the idea that we can make sense of reality as existing objectively, independently of our capacities to come to know it. Part One argues that traditional realism can be explicated as a doctrine about truth — that truth is objective, that is, public, bivalent, and epistemically independent. Part Two argues that a form of Hilary Putnam’s model-theoretic argument demonstrates that no such notion of truth can be founded on the idea of correspondence, as explained in model-theoretic terms. Part Three ... More

Keywords: Hilary Putnam, model-theoretic, correspondence, non-correspondence, objectivity, formal, Tarskian, John McDowell, Robert Brandom, semantic structure, antirealism

Bibliographic Information

Print publication date: 2006 Print ISBN-13: 9780199286690
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2006 DOI:10.1093/0199286698.001.0001

Authors

Affiliations are at time of print publication.

Barry Taylor, author
University of Melbourne

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