Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Environment and StatecraftThe Strategy of Environmental Treaty-Making$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Scott Barrett

Print publication date: 2005

Print ISBN-13: 9780199286096

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2005

DOI: 10.1093/0199286094.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2017. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy).date: 19 October 2017

Games with Multiple Equilibria

Games with Multiple Equilibria

Chapter:
(p.85) 4 Games with Multiple Equilibria
Source:
Environment and Statecraft
Author(s):

Scott Barrett (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0199286094.003.0004

This chapter explains that some international environmental problems are characterized by multiple equilibria, meaning that more than one outcome can be sustained by the anarchic international system. Some problems just happen to be chicken and coordination games. Others can sometimes be manipulated, by means of a treaty, to resemble games of these types. Case studies include the setting of aviation and automobile standards.

Keywords:   chicken game, coordination game, mixed strategies, correlated strategies, standards agreements, harmonization, geography

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .