Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Zombies and Consciousness$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Robert Kirk

Print publication date: 2005

Print ISBN-13: 9780199285488

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: February 2006

DOI: 10.1093/0199285489.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2019. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy).date: 21 March 2019

The Case for Zombies

The Case for Zombies

Chapter:
(p.24) 3 The Case for Zombies
Source:
Zombies and Consciousness
Author(s):

Robert Kirk

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0199285489.003.0003

The definition of zombies is clarified, and the main arguments for the alleged possibility of zombies are examined. The ‘conceivability argument’ is influential: zombies are conceivable; whatever is conceivable is possible; therefore zombies are possible. Chalmers’s arguments for conceivability are given special attention, notably his use of Block’s homunculus-head; the apparent gap between physical information and facts about experiences; Jackson’s ‘knowledge argument’; and the argument from the ‘absence of analysis’. It is argued that none of the arguments is conclusive.

Keywords:   Block, Chalmers, conceivability argument, consciousness, homunculus-head, Jackson’s knowledge argument, zombies

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .