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Zombies and Consciousness$
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Robert Kirk

Print publication date: 2005

Print ISBN-13: 9780199285488

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: February 2006

DOI: 10.1093/0199285489.001.0001

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Zombies and Minimal Physicalism

Zombies and Minimal Physicalism

Chapter:
(p.7) 2 Zombies and Minimal Physicalism
Source:
Zombies and Consciousness
Author(s):

Robert Kirk

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0199285489.003.0002

Epiphenomenalism accepts the causal closure of the physical, hence the possibility of zombies. But it is argued, via consideration of the ‘redescription thesis’, that physicalism involves commitment to the ‘strict implication thesis’, according to which the narrowly physical truths about the world strictly imply the significant mental truths. This is an empirical thesis but depends on logical or conceptual relations, although physicalists are not therefore compelled to subscribe to any strong doctrine of conceptual analysis. It follows that if zombies are even barely possible, physicalism is false. It also follows that bald assertions of psycho-physical identity do not dispense physicalists from commitment to this conclusion, nor does a thesis of a posteriori necessity.

Keywords:   a posteriori necessity, conceptual analysis, epiphenomenalism, physicalism, redescription thesis, strict implication thesis, zombies

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