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Zombies and Consciousness$

Robert Kirk

Print publication date: 2005

Print ISBN-13: 9780199285488

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: February 2006

DOI: 10.1093/0199285489.001.0001

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(p.219) Bibliography

(p.219) Bibliography

Source:
Zombies and Consciousness
Publisher:
Oxford University Press

Bibliography references:

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