Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Plato on Pleasure and the Good Life$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Daniel Russell

Print publication date: 2005

Print ISBN-13: 9780199282845

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2005

DOI: 10.1093/0199282846.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2017. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy).date: 23 April 2018

The Philebus, Part 2: Pleasure Transformed, or How the Necessity of Pleasure for Happiness is Consistent with the Sufficiency of Virtue for Happiness

The Philebus, Part 2: Pleasure Transformed, or How the Necessity of Pleasure for Happiness is Consistent with the Sufficiency of Virtue for Happiness

Chapter:
(p.166) 6 The Philebus, Part 2: Pleasure Transformed, or How the Necessity of Pleasure for Happiness is Consistent with the Sufficiency of Virtue for Happiness
Source:
Plato on Pleasure and the Good Life
Author(s):

Daniel Russell (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0199282846.003.0007

In Philebus, Plato makes clear his view that pleasure is actually part of the agent's own goodness, because her goodness consists in, among other things, the sorts of attitudes she has and perspectives she adopts in the various dimensions of her life, and her pleasure is itself just such a crucial attitude and perspective. When Plato says that pleasure is necessary for happiness, he does not mean that good character could never be enough for happiness without pleasure. Rather, as the dialogue unfolds he reveals that pleasure is actually a part of good character as a whole, the product of reason's transforming all dimensions of the self. Since good character, or virtue, is this sort of whole, pleasure is necessary for happiness, because virtue is sufficient for happiness. Thus, the key to understanding Plato's position can be found in his analysis of the nature of pleasure and how it functions in a person's life. This chapter argues that in Plato's Philebus the pleasure of a virtuous character is necessary and important for happiness because it is a necessary and important part of that character, which, in turn, is what determines happiness.

Keywords:   Plato, pleasure, happiness, virtue, virtuous character

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .