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Scepticism Comes Alive$

Bryan Frances

Print publication date: 2005

Print ISBN-13: 9780199282135

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2005

DOI: 10.1093/0199282137.001.0001

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(p.204) References

(p.204) References

Scepticism Comes Alive
Oxford University Press

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