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Epistemic Luck
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Epistemic Luck

Duncan Pritchard

Abstract

One of the key supposed ‘platitudes’ of contemporary epistemology is the claim that knowledge excludes luck. One can see the attraction of such a claim, in that knowledge is something that one can take credit for; it is an achievement of sorts, and yet luck undermines genuine achievements. The problem, however, is that luck seems to be an all-pervasive feature of our epistemic enterprises that tempts us to think that either scepticism is true, and we don’t know very much after all, or else knowledge is compatible with knowledge after all. My claim is that we do not need to choose between these ... More

Keywords: assertion, content externalism/internalism, contextualism, epistemic externalism/internalism, epistemic luck, epistemology, luck, Mooreanism, moral luck, neo-Mooreanism, Pyrrhonism, relevant alternatives, reliabilism, scepticism, virtue epistemology

Bibliographic Information

Print publication date: 2005 Print ISBN-13: 9780199280384
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: April 2005 DOI:10.1093/019928038X.001.0001

Authors

Affiliations are at time of print publication.

Duncan Pritchard, author
Department of Philosophy, University of Stirling
Author Webpage