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Microeconomic TheoryA Concise Course$
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James Bergin

Print publication date: 2005

Print ISBN-13: 9780199280292

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: July 2005

DOI: 10.1093/0199280290.001.0001

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Auctions II: Dependent Values

Auctions II: Dependent Values

Chapter:
(p.121) 8 Auctions II: Dependent Values
Source:
Microeconomic Theory
Author(s):

James Bergin (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0199280290.003.0008

Considers auctions with non-independent valuations. Equilibrium bidding behaviour in the first price, second price, and English auctions is characterized. Revenue comparisons are given, showing that the revenue equivalence theorem fails for the standard auctions when values are correlated. The linkage principle (price is positively ‘linked’ to information) is described. Finally, full surplus extraction is discussed at length.

Keywords:   Affiliated values, first price auction, optimal auctions, second price auction, surplus extraction, the linkage principle, the winners curse

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