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Art and IntentionA Philosophical Study$
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Paisley Livingston

Print publication date: 2005

Print ISBN-13: 9780199278060

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: April 2005

DOI: 10.1093/0199278067.001.0001

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WHAT ARE INTENTIONS?

WHAT ARE INTENTIONS?

Chapter:
(p.1) Chapter 1 WHAT ARE INTENTIONS?
Source:
Art and Intention
Author(s):

Paisley Livingston (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0199278067.003.0001

Presents a survey of prevalent assumptions about the nature and status of intentions, beginning with minimalist and reductionist views and moving on to accounts of intention as a type of psychological state having a range of characteristic functions. Drawing upon work in philosophical psychology and action theory by such philosophers as Alfred Mele and Michael Bratman, Livingston characterizes intentions in terms of its functions in the lives of temporally situated, deliberating, and striving agents: intentions initiate, guide, and sustain intentional behaviour; they prompt and terminate practical reasoning, and help coordinate an individual agent’s behaviour over time, as well as interaction between agents. With reference to epistemic and ontological worries about mentalism, Livingston also surveys debates over the status of intentionalist psychology more generally, assessing error theory as well as strong and weak realist perspectives. Serious problems with extreme anti-intentionalist arguments and proposals warrant continued reliance upon intentionalist discourse.

Keywords:   action theory, eliminativism, intention, intention-in-action, intentionalist psychology, plans

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