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ConsciousnessEssays from a Higher-Order Perspective$
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Peter Carruthers

Print publication date: 2005

Print ISBN-13: 9780199277360

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: July 2005

DOI: 10.1093/0199277362.001.0001

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Conscious Experience Versus Conscious Thought

Conscious Experience Versus Conscious Thought

Chapter:
(p.134) CHAPTER 8 Conscious Experience Versus Conscious Thought
Source:
Consciousness
Author(s):

Peter Carruthers (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0199277362.003.0008

Argues that there are different constraints on theories of conscious experience as against theories of conscious propositional thought. (So what is problematic or puzzling about each of these phenomena is not of the same, but of different, types.) But, argues, nevertheless, that it is plausible to think that both conscious experience and conscious thought involve some sort of self-reference. In pursuing these questions, the author explores the prospects for a defensible form of eliminativism concerning conscious thinking, one that would leave the reality of conscious experience untouched. In the end, he argues that while there might be no such thing as conscious judging or conscious wanting, there is (or may well be) such a thing as conscious generic thinking.

Keywords:   conscious experience, conscious thought, eliminativism, inner speech, self-interpretation, self-reference

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