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ConsciousnessEssays from a Higher-Order Perspective$
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Peter Carruthers

Print publication date: 2005

Print ISBN-13: 9780199277360

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: July 2005

DOI: 10.1093/0199277362.001.0001

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Dual-Content Theory: the Explanatory Advantages

Dual-Content Theory: the Explanatory Advantages

(p.98) CHAPTER 6 Dual-Content Theory: the Explanatory Advantages

Peter Carruthers (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

Presents and develops what the author takes to be the main argument, both against the most plausible version of first-order representationalist theory of phenomenal consciousness, and in support of his own higher-order perception/dual-content account. The primary goal of the chapter is to lay out the case for saying that dual-content theory (but not first-order theory) provides us with a successful reductive explanation of the various puzzling features of phenomenal consciousness. Also takes up the question whether a first-order theorist can also accept the higher-order analogue contents postulated by dual-content theory, and can thereby obtain all of the advantages of the latter, while retaining their distinctively first-order account of phenomenal consciousness itself. It returns a negative answer.

Keywords:   dual content theory, first-order representationalism, higher-order perception, phenomenal consciousness, reductive explanation

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