Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
ConsciousnessEssays from a Higher-Order Perspective$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Peter Carruthers

Print publication date: 2005

Print ISBN-13: 9780199277360

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: July 2005

DOI: 10.1093/0199277362.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2019. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy).date: 18 April 2019

Phenomenal Concepts and Higher-Order Experiences

Phenomenal Concepts and Higher-Order Experiences

Chapter:
(p.79) CHAPTER 5 Phenomenal Concepts and Higher-Order Experiences
Source:
Consciousness
Author(s):

Peter Carruthers (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0199277362.003.0005

Argues for the need to recognise higher-order perceptual experiences and briefly argues for the superiority of the author’s own dispositional HOT version of higher-order perception (HOP) theory (here described as ‘dual-content theory’). But its main focus is on purely recognitional concepts of experience (often called ‘phenomenal concepts’). There is an emerging consensus amongst naturalistically minded philosophers that the existence of such concepts is the key to blocking the zombie-style arguments of both dualist mysterians like Chalmers and physicalist mysterians like McGinn and Levine. But, the author argues in this chapter that a successful account of the possibility of such concepts requires acceptance of one or another form of higher-order perception theory.

Keywords:   Chalmers, dual content theory, higher-order perception, Levine, McGinn, phenomenal concepts, recognitional concepts of experience, zombies

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .