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The Retreat of ReasonA dilemma in the philosophy of life$
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Ingmar Persson

Print publication date: 2005

Print ISBN-13: 9780199276905

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: February 2006

DOI: 10.1093/0199276900.001.0001

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THE DILEMMA AS REGARDS PERSONAL NEUTRALITY

THE DILEMMA AS REGARDS PERSONAL NEUTRALITY

Chapter:
(p.369) 29 THE DILEMMA AS REGARDS PERSONAL NEUTRALITY
Source:
The Retreat of Reason
Author(s):

Ingmar Persson (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0199276900.003.0030

This chapter sets out the second dilemma or conflict between the rationalist aim of having rational attitudes and the satisfactionalist aim of fulfilment-maximization. Since it has been found that the bias towards oneself is irrational, rationalists must strive to rid themselves of it. It goes without saying that prudentialist maximizers whose goal is to see to it that their own life contains as much fulfilment as possible should retain this bias. But this chapter argues that it is irrational, even for those satisfactionalists who accept the requirement of universalizability and endorse the universal fulfilment-maximization goal of utilitarianism, to strive to rid themselves of this bias.

Keywords:   bias towards oneself, fulfilment-maximization, rational attitudes, universalizability, utilitarianism

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