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Speaking My MindExpression and Self-Knowledge$
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Dorit Bar-On

Print publication date: 2004

Print ISBN-13: 9780199276288

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2005

DOI: 10.1093/0199276285.001.0001

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Content Externalism, Skepticism, and the Recognitional Conception of Self-Knowledge

Content Externalism, Skepticism, and the Recognitional Conception of Self-Knowledge

Chapter:
(p.147) 5 Content Externalism, Skepticism, and the Recognitional Conception of Self-Knowledge
Source:
Speaking My Mind
Author(s):

Dorit Bar-On (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0199276285.003.0005

This chapter examines a much-discussed puzzle about how the security of avowals (specifically, the security of avowals that specify one’s mental contents) can be reconciled with so-called ’externalism’ about content. It has been argued that if externalism is true, then we face a form of scepticism about content, analogous to scepticism about the external world. However, the author argues that this reasoning relies on a ’recognitional conception’ of knowledge of content, which ought to be rejected. She further suggests that self-ascriptions of mental content are protected from sceptical arguments precisely because they do not involve or require a separate recognition of those contents.

Keywords:   externalism about content, recognition, self-knowledge, scepticism

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