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Justification without AwarenessA Defense of Epistemic Externalism$

Michael Bergmann

Print publication date: 2006

Print ISBN-13: 9780199275748

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2006

DOI: 10.1093/0199275742.001.0001

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(p.241) References

(p.241) References

Justification without Awareness
Oxford University Press

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