Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
How Things Might Have BeenIndividuals, Kinds, and Essential Properties$

Penelope Mackie

Print publication date: 2006

Print ISBN-13: 9780199272204

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2006

DOI: 10.1093/0199272204.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2017. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: null; date: 27 February 2017

(p.201) Bibliography

(p.201) Bibliography

Source:
How Things Might Have Been
Publisher:
Oxford University Press

Bibliography references:

Adams, R. M. 1979. ‘Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity’. The Journal of Philosophy, 76: 5–26.

Ayer, A. J. 1973. The Central Questions of Philosophy. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson. Also published by Penguin Books (London), 1976.

Ayers, M. 1974. ‘Individuals Without Sortals’. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 4: 113–48.

Baker, L. R. 2000. Persons and Bodies: a Constitution View. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bottani, A., Carrara, M., and Giaretta, P. (eds.) 2002. Individuals, Essence and Identity: Themes of Analytic Metaphysics. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Brody, B. 1980. Identity and Essence. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Chandler, H. 1975. ‘Rigid Designation’. The Journal of Philosophy, 72: 363–9.

—— 1976. ‘Plantinga and the Contingently Possible’. Analysis, 36: 106–9.

Chisholm, R. 1967. ‘Identity Through Possible Worlds: Some Questions’. Noûs, 1: 1–8. Reprinted in Loux (ed.) 1979.

Coburn, R. 1986. ‘Individual Essences and Possible Worlds’, in French, Uehling, and Wettstein (eds.) 1986, 165–83.

Devitt, M., and Sterelny, K. 1987. Language and Reality. Oxford: Blackwell.

Divers, J. 2002. Possible Worlds. London: Routledge.

Dummett, M. 1973. Frege: Philosophy of Language. London: Duckworth.

Dupré, J. 1981. ‘Natural Kinds and Biological Taxa’. The Philosophical Review, 90: 66–90.

Ellis, B. 2001. Scientific Essentialism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

—— 2002. The Philosophy of Nature: A Guide to the New Essentialism. Chesham: Acumen.

Evans, G. 1973. ‘The Causal Theory of Names’. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, suppl. vol. 47: 187–208. Reprinted in Evans 1985.

—— 1979. ‘Reference and Contingency’. The Monist, 62: 161–89. Reprinted in Evans 1985.

—— 1985. Collected Papers. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Fine, K. 1978. ‘Model Theory for Modal Logic Part I: the De Re/De Dicto Distinction’. The Journal of Philosophical Logic, 7: 125–56.

Forbes, G. 1980. ‘Origin and Identity’. Philosophical Studies, 37: 353–62.

—— 1985. The Metaphysics of Modality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

—— 1986. ‘In Defense of Absolute Essentialism’, in French, Uehling, and Wettstein (eds.) 1986, 3–31.

—— 1994. ‘A New Riddle of Existence’, in J. Tomberlin (ed.), Philosophical Perspectives 8: Logic and Language. Atascadero, Calif.: Ridgeview, 415–30.

(p.202) Forbes, G. 1997. ‘Essentialism’. In Hale and Wright (eds.) 1997, 515–33.

—— 2002. ‘Origins and Identities’, in Bottani, Carrara, and Giaretta (eds.) 2002, 319–40.

French, P., Uehling, T., and Wettstein, H. (eds.) 1986. Midwest Studies in Philosophy XI: Studies in Essentialism. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Gale, R. M. 1984. ‘Wiggins's Thesis D(x)’. Philosophical Studies, 45: 239–45.

Garrett, B. J. 1988. ‘Identity and Extrinsicness’. Mind, 97: 105–9.

Geach, P. T. 1967. ‘Identity’. Review of Metaphysics, 21: 3–12.

Reprinted in Geach, Logic Matters (Oxford: Blackwell, 1972).

Gibbard, A. 1975. ‘Contingent Identity’. The Journal of Philosophical Logic, 4: 187–221.

Reprinted in M. Rea (ed.), Material Constitution: a Reader (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997).

Hale, B. 1997. ‘Modality’, in Hale and Wright (eds.) 1997, 487–514.

—— and Wright, C. (eds.) 1997. A Companion to the Philosophy of Language. Oxford: Blackwell.

Hawthorne, J., and Gendler, T. S. 2000. ‘Origin Essentialism: the Arguments Revisited’. Mind, 109: 285–98.

Kant, I. 1929. Critique of Pure Reason, trans. by N. Kemp Smith. London: Macmillan.

Kaplan, D. 1978. ‘Dthat’, in P. Cole (ed.), Syntax and Semantics, 9: Pragmatics. New York: Academic Press, 221–43.

Reprinted in P. Yourgrau (ed.), Demonstratives (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990).

Kirwan, C. 1970. ‘How Strong are the Objections to Essence?’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 71: 43–59.

Kripke, S. 1972a. ‘Identity and Necessity’, in M. K. Munitz (ed.), Identity and Individuation. New York: New York University Press, 135–64.

—— 1972b. ‘Naming and Necessity’, in D. Davidson and G. Harman (eds.), Semantics of Natural Language. Dordrecht: Reidel, 252–355. (Reprinted in revised form as a monograph by Blackwell, Oxford, 1980.)

—— 1980. Naming and Necessity. Oxford: Blackwell. (Expanded monograph version of Kripke 1972b.)

Leibniz, G. W. 1973. Selections from Leibniz, Philosophical Writings, ed. Parkinson. London: Dent.

Lewis, D. 1968. ‘Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic’. The Journal of Philosophy, 65: 113–26. Reprinted in Loux (ed.) 1979, and (with additional ‘Postscripts’) in Lewis 1983.

—— 1971. ‘Counterparts of Persons and Their Bodies’. The Journal of Philosophy, 68: 203–11. Reprinted in Lewis 1983.

—— 1973. Counterfactuals. Oxford: Blackwell.

—— 1983. Philosophical Papers, vol. 1. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

—— 1986a. On the Plurality of Worlds. Oxford: Blackwell.

—— 1986b. Philosophical Papers, vol. 2. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

(p.203) —— 1986c. ‘Events’, in Lewis 1986b, 241–69.

Linsky, L. (ed.) 1971. Reference and Modality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Locke, J. 1975. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. P. Nidditch. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Originally published in 1690.

Loux, M. (ed.) 1979. The Possible and the Actual. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Lowe, E. J. 1995. Locke on Human Understanding. London: Routledge.

—— 2002. A Survey of Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

McGinn, C. 1975–6. ‘A Priori and A Posteriori Knowledge’. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 76: 195–208.

—— 1976. ‘On the Necessity of Origin’. The Journal of Philosophy, 73: 127–35.

McKay, T. J. 1986. ‘Against Constitutional Sufficiency Principles’, in French, Uehling, and Wettstein (eds.) 1986, 295–304.

Mackie, D. 1999. ‘Personal Identity and Dead People’. Philosophical Studies, 95: 219–42.

Mackie, J. L. 1974. ‘De What Re is De Re Modality?’ The Journal of Philosophy, 71: 551–61.

Mackie, P. 1987. ‘Essence, Origin, and Bare Identity’. Mind, 96: 173–201.

—— 1989. ‘Identity and Extrinsicness: Reply to Garrett’. Mind, 98: 105–17.

—— 1994. ‘Sortal Concepts and Essential Properties’. The Philosophical Quarterly, 44: 311–33.

—— 1998. ‘Identity, Time, and Necessity’. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 98: 59–78.

—— 2002. ‘Forbes on Origins and Identities’, in Bottani, Carrara, and Giaretta (eds.) 2002, 341–52.

Mellor, D. H. 1977. ‘Natural Kinds’. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 28: 299–312.

Reprinted in Mellor, Matters of Metaphysics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

Mills, E. 1991. ‘Forbes’s Branching Conception of Possible Worlds’. Analysis, 51: 48–50.

Moore, A. (ed.) 1993. Meaning and Reference. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Noonan, H. 1983. ‘The Necessity of Origin’. Mind, 92: 1–20.

—— 1985a. ‘Wiggins, Artefact Identity, and “Best Candidate” Theories’. Analysis, 45: 4–8.

—— 1985b. ‘The Only x and y Principle’. Analysis, 45: 79–83.

—— 1989. Personal Identity. London: Routledge.

—— 1991. ‘Indeterminate Identity, Contingent Identity, and Abelardian Predicates’. The Philosophical Quarterly, 41: 183–93.

—— 1993. ‘Constitution is Identity’. Mind, 102: 133–46.

Nozick, R. 1981. Philosophical Explanations. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Olson, E. 1997. The Human Animal. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Parfit, D. 1984. Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

(p.204) Plantinga, A. 1974. The Nature of Necessity. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Prior, A. N. 1960. ‘Identifiable Individuals’. Review of Metaphysics, 13: 684–96. Reprinted in Prior 1968.

—— 1968. Papers on Time and Tense. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Putnam, H. 1973. ‘Meaning and Reference’. The Journal of Philosophy, 70: 699–711. Reprinted in Schwartz (ed.) 1977, and in Moore (ed.) 1993.

—— 1975. ‘The Meaning of “Meaning”, in Putnam, Mind, Language, and Reality: Philosophical Papers, vol. 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 215–71.

Quine, W. V. 1961. ‘Reference and Modality’, in Quine, From a Logical Point of View. New York: Harper & Row, 139–59. Reprinted in Linsky (ed.) 1971.

Robertson, T. 1998. ‘Possibilities and the Arguments for Origin Essentialism’. Mind, 107: 729–49.

Robinson, D. 1985. ‘Can Amoebae Divide Without Multiplying?’ Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 63: 299–319.

Rosen, G. 1990. ‘Modal Fictionalism’. Mind, 99: 327–54.

Salmon, N. 1979. ‘How Not to Derive Essentialism from the Theory of Reference’. The Journal of Philosophy, 76: 703–25.

—— 1982. Reference and Essence. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Schwartz, S. (ed.) 1977. Naming, Necessity, and Natural Kinds. Ithaca, NY & London: Cornell University Press.

—— 1984. ‘Salmon on Reference and Essentialism’. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 65: 288–91.

Shoemaker, S. 1984. ‘Personal Identity: A Materialist's Account’, in S. Shoemaker and R. Swinburne, Personal Identity. Oxford: Blackwell.

Snowdon, P. 1990. ‘Persons, Animals, and Ourselves’, in C. Gill (ed.), The Person and the Human Mind. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 83–107.

Stalnaker, R. 1986. ‘Counterparts and Identity’, in French, Uehling, and Wettstein (eds.) 1986, 121–40.

Strawson, P. F. 1959. Individuals. London: Methuen.

—— 1976. ‘Entity and Identity’, in H. D. Lewis (ed.), Contemporary British Philosophy, Fourth Series. London: Allen & Unwin, 193–220. Reprinted in Strawson 1997.

—— 1979. ‘May Bes and Might Have Beens’, in A. Margalit (ed.), Meaning and Use. Dordrecht: Reidel, 229–38. Reprinted in Strawson 1997.

—— 1981. ‘Critical Notice of Wiggins, Sameness and Substance’. Mind, 90: 603–7.

—— 1997. Entity and Identity. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

van Inwagen, P. 1985. ‘Plantinga on Trans‐world Identity’, in J. E. Tomberlin and P. van Inwagen (eds.), Alvin Plantinga. Dordrecht: Reidel, 101–20.

Reprinted in van Inwagen, Ontology, Identity, and Modality: Essays in Metaphysics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

(p.205) Wiggins, D. 1967. Identity and Spatio‐temporal Continuity. Oxford: Blackwell.

—— 1976. ‘The De Re “Must”: a Note on the Logical Form of Essentialist Claims’, in G. Evans and J. McDowell (eds.), Truth and Meaning. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 285–312.

—— 1980. Sameness and Substance. Oxford: Blackwell.

—— 2001. Sameness and Substance Renewed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Yablo, S. 1988. Review of Forbes, The Metaphysics of Modality. The Journal of Philosophy, 85: 329–37. (p.206)