Conclusions: Divine Command Morality in a Pluralistic Society
This chapter responds to three objections to divine command theory: that it violates human autonomy, could justify evil actions such as child sacrifice, and would lead to sectarian strife. Divine command theory views human beings as responsible choosers and respects the right kind of autonomy. Looking at the case of Abraham and Issac, this chapter argues that only a good and loving God deserves to be obeyed, and God cannot command what is truly bad, though he can and does issue commands that conflict with accepted moral convictions. Such an ethic is not sectarian in any harmful sense, because it rejects the use of coercion and cannot sanction the privileging of any religious view by use of state power. Such an ethic contributes to a truly humane society by requiring us to recognize that we are all neighbours and that no human society or institution can rightly ask for that unconditional devotion that should be offered to God alone.
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