Outlines the author's institutional and empirical approach, which is to look at the ‘big picture’ rules of the game (institutions, in the form of both formal laws and informal norms and practices) and the fine detail of how those rules are actually impacting incentives, information, and bargaining in the Japanese economy (empirics). In each chapter, the authors explain behaviour in the Japanese economy as a function of the rules of the game. Where applicable, they describe how these rules are changing and why. This approach, novel to studies of Japan, offers compelling answers to heretofore unanswered questions, and provides new perspectives on debates scholars may have thought to be settled.
Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.
If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.