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Monetary Unions and Hard Pegs$
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Volbert Alexander, George M. von Furstenberg, and Jacques Mélitz

Print publication date: 2004

Print ISBN-13: 9780199271405

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: August 2004

DOI: 10.1093/0199271402.001.0001

ContentsFRONT MATTER

Electronic Money and the Optimal Size of Monetary Unions

Chapter:
(p. 321 ) 15 Electronic Money and the Optimal Size of Monetary Unions
Source:
Monetary Unions and Hard Pegs
Author(s):

Claudia Costa Storti

Paul De Grauwe

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0199271402.003.0015

The question is how the advent of electronic money affects the size of optimal currency areas. In particular, we study whether currencies of small countries will tend to disappear as a result of electronic money. The three major forces that will be at work during the transition to a cashless society have different implications for the question at hand. These forces are (a) raising the potential for financial instability during the transition, (b) giving rise to new monetary network externalities that affect the costs and benefits of national media of exchange, and (c) leading to the emergence of new stores of value.

Keywords:   currency competition, electronic money, financial instability, network externalities, optimal size of monetary unions, transaction costs

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