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The Realm of Reason$
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Christopher Peacocke

Print publication date: 2003

Print ISBN-13: 9780199270729

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: April 2004

DOI: 10.1093/0199270724.001.0001

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Explaining Perceptual Entitlement

Explaining Perceptual Entitlement

Chapter:
(p.74) CHAPTER 3 Explaining Perceptual Entitlement
Source:
The Realm of Reason
Author(s):

Christopher Peacocke (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0199270724.003.0004

Concerns itself with explaining the conclusion of the preceding chapter, namely that there is an entitlement to take experiences with instance‐individuated contents at face value. The author explains this by, first, formulating and defending a general principle about the explanation of complexity; second, establishing that this general principle applies to the explanation of the occurrence of experiences with instance‐individuated contents, and does so in such a way as to support the presumption that the contents of such experiences are correct; third, arguing that this application to perceptual states provides the philosophical explanation of why one is entitled to take experiences with instance‐individuated contents at face value.

Keywords:   complexity, content, entitlement, experience, Individuation, Perception

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