Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Ethics Without Principles$

Jonathan Dancy

Print publication date: 2004

Print ISBN-13: 9780199270026

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2005

DOI: 10.1093/0199270023.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2017. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: null; date: 26 February 2017



Ethics Without Principles
Oxford University Press

Bibliography references:

Audi, R. (1996) ‘Intuitionism, Pluralism, and the Foundations of Ethics’, in Sinnott-Armstrong and Timmons (1996: 101–36).

—— (1998) ‘Moderate Intuitionism and the Epistemology of Moral Judgement’, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 1: 15–44, esp. 36–41.

Bakhurst, D. (2000) ‘Ethical Particularism in Context’, in Hooker and Little (2000: 157–77).

Baldwin, T. (2002) ‘Intuitionism and Common Sense’, in Stratton-Lake (2002: 92–112).

Belzer, M. (1986) ‘Reasoning with Defeasible Principles’, Synthese, 66: 135–98.

Bennett, J. (1995) The Act Itself (Oxford: Clarendon Press).

Berlin, I. (1996) The Sense of Reality (Oxford: Oxford University Press), esp. 33–5, 44–5.

Blackburn, S. (1981) ‘Rule-Following and Moral Realism’, in Holtzman and Leich (1981: 163–87).

—— (1992) ‘Through Thick and Thin’, Proceedings of The Aristotelian Society, suppl. vol. 66: 285–299.

—— (1996) ‘Securing the Nots’, in Sinnott-Armstrong and Timmons (1996: 82–100, esp. 97–9).

—— (1998) Ruling Passions (Oxford: Clarendon Press).

Blum, L. (1994) Moral Perception and Particularity (New York: Cambridge University Press).

Bowden, P. (1998) ‘Ethical Attention: Accumulating Understandings’, European Journal of Philosophy, 6: 59–77.

Brandom, R. B. (1994) Making It Explicit (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press).

—— (2000) Articulating Reasons: An Introduction to Inferentialism (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press).

Broad, C. D. (1930) Five Types of Ethical Theory (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul).

Broadie, S. W. (1993) Ethics with Aristotle (New York: Oxford University Press).

Brody, B. (1979) ‘Intuitions and Objective Moral Knowledge’, The Monist, 62: 446–56.

Broome, J. (1991) Weighing Goods (Oxford: Blackwell).

—— (1993) ‘Can a Humean be Moderate?’, in R. G. Frey and C. Morris (eds.), Value, Welfare and Morality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 51–73.

—— (2000) ‘Normative Requirements’, in J. Dancy (ed.), Normativity (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000), 78–99.

(p.217) Broome, J. (2004) ‘Reasons’, in Wallace et al. (2004: 28–55).

Burton, S. (1994) ‘Particularism, Discretion, and the Rule of Law’, Nomos, 36: 178–201.

Carritt, E. F. (1930) The Theory of Morals (London: Oxford University Press).

Cartwright, N. (1983) How the Laws of Physics Lie (Oxford: Clarendon Press).

Cavell, S. (1979) The Claim of Reason (Oxford: Clarendon Press).

Chang, R. (ed.) (1998) Incommensurability, Incomparability and Practical Reason (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press).

Chisholm, R. (1976) Person and Object (LaSalle, Ill.: Open Court Publishing Co.).

—— (1981) ‘Defining Intrinsic Value’, Analysis, 41: 99–100.

Coetzee, P. (1985) ‘Principles and Virtues—or—Principles or Virtues’, South African Journal of Philosophy, 4: 25–8.

Crisp, R. (1993) ‘Motivation, Universality, and the Good’, Ratio, 6: 181–90.

—— (1996) ‘The Dualism of Practical Reason’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 96: 53–73.

—— (2000) ‘Particularizing Particularism’, in Hooker and Little (2000: 23–47).

Cullity, G. (1994) ‘International Aid and the Scope of Kindness’, Ethics, 105: 99–127.

—— (1997) ‘Practical Theory’, in Cullity and Gaut (1997: 101–24).

—— (2002) ‘Particularism and Presumptive Reasons’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, suppl. vol. 76: 169–90.

—— and Gaut, B. (eds.) (1997) Ethics and Practical Reason (Oxford: Clarendon Press).

Dancy, J. (1981) ‘On Moral Properties’, Mind, 90: 367–85.

—— (1982) ‘Intuitionism in Meta-epistemology’, Philosophical Studies, 42: 395–408.

—— (1983) ‘Ethical Particularism and Morally Relevant Properties’, Mind, 92: 530–47.

—— (1985) ‘The Role of Imaginary Cases in Ethics’, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 66: 141–53.

—— (1992) ‘Caring about Justice’, Philosophy, 67: 447–66.

—— (1993) Moral Reasons, (Oxford: Blackwell).

—— (1995) ‘In Defense of Thick Concepts’, in P. French, T. E. Uehling, Jr., and H. K. Wettstein (eds.), Midwest Studies in Philosophy, vol. 20: Moral Concepts, 263–79.

—— (1999a) ‘Can the Particularist Learn the Difference between Right and Wrong?’, in K. Brinkmann (ed.), The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, vol. 1: Ethics (Bowling Green, OH: Philosophy Documentation Center, 1999), 59–72.

—— (1999b) ‘Defending Particularism’, Metaphilosophy, 30: 25–32.

—— (1999c) ‘Motivation, Dispositions and Aims’, Theoria, 65: 144–55.

—— (1999d) ‘On the Logical and Moral Adequacy of Particularism’, Theoria, 65: 212–24.

(p.218) —— (2000a) ‘The Particularist's Progress’, in Hooker and Little (2000: 130–56).

—— (2000b) Practical Reality (Oxford: Clarendon Press).

—— (2000c) ‘Scanlon's Principles’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, suppl. vol. 74: 319–38.

—— (2000d) ‘Should we Pass the Buck?’ in A. O'Hear (ed.), Philosophy, the Good, the True, and the Beautiful (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 159–73.

—— (2001) ‘Moral Particularism’, published online in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

—— (2002) ‘La Justesse et ce qui rend-juste’, in J.-M. Monnoyer (ed.), La Structure du Monde: Objets, Propriétés, Etats de Choses. Renouveau de la Métaphysique dans l'école Australienne de Philosophie, no. hors série de Recherches sur la Philosophie et le Langage (Paris: Librairie philosophique J. Vrin, 2002), 443–58.

—— (2003a) ‘What do Reasons Do?’, Southern Journal of Philosophy, 41 (supplement): 95–113; to be reprinted in T. Horgan and M. Timmons (eds.), Ethics after Moore (Oxford University Press, forthcoming).

—— (2003b) ‘Are there Organic Unities?’, Ethics, 113: 629–50.

—— (2004a) ‘Enticing Reasons’, in Wallace et al. (2004: 91–118).

—— (2004b) ‘On the Importance of Making Things Right’, Ratio, 17: 229–37.

Devereux, D. (1986) ‘Particular and Universal in Aristotle's Conception of Practical Knowledge’, Review of Metaphysics, 29: 483–504.

Dretske, F. (1970) ‘Epistemic Operators’, Journal of Philosophy, 67: 1007–23.

Dreyfus, H., and Dreyfus, S. (1986) ‘What is Moral Maturity? Towards a Phenomenology of Ethical Expertise’, in J. Ogilvy (ed.), Revisioning Philosophy (Albany, NY: SUNY Press).

Dworkin, G. (1995) ‘Unprincipled Ethics’, in P. French, T. E. Uehling, Jr., and H. K. Wettstein (eds.), Midwest Studies in Philosophy, vol. 20: Moral Concepts, 224–39.

Ewing, A. C. (1928) The Morality of Punishment (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co.).

—— (1947) The Definition of Good (London: Macmillan).

Frankena, W. (1963) Ethics (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall), esp. 16–17, 23–5.

Frazier, R. (1995) ‘Moral Relevance and Ceteris Paribus Principles’, Ratio, 8: 113–27.

Friedman, M. (1993) ‘Care and Context in Moral Reasoning’, in her What Are Friends For? (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press), 91–116.

Garfield, J. (2000) ‘Particularity and Principle: The Structure of Moral Knowledge’, in Hooker and Little (2000: 178–204).

Garrard, E., and McNaughton, D. (1998) ‘Mapping Moral Motivation’, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 1: 45–59.

Gaut, B. (1993) ‘Moral Pluralism’, Philosophical Papers, 22: 17–40.

Gay, R. (1985) ‘Ethical Pluralism: A Reply to Dancy's “Ethical Particularism and Morally Relevant Properties” ’, Mind, 94: 250–62.

(p.219) Giaquinto, M. (1998) ‘Epistemology of the Obvious: A Geometrical Case’, Philosophical Studies, 92: 181–204.

Gibbard, A. (1990) Wise Choices, Apt Feelings (Oxford: Clarendon Press).

Goldstein, I. (1989) ‘Pleasure and Pain: Unconditional, Intrinsic Value’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 50: 255–76.

Hampton, J. E. (1998) The Authority of Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Hansson, S. O. (1996) ‘What is Ceteris Paribus Preference?’, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 25: 307–22.

Hare, R. M. (1963) Freedom and Reason (Oxford: Clarendon Press).

Herman, B. (1993) The Practice of Moral Judgement (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press).

Holton, R. (2002) ‘Principles and Particularisms’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, suppl. vol. 76: 191–210.

Holtzman, S., and Leich, C. (eds.) (1981) Wittgenstein: To Follow a Rule (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul).

Hooker, B. W. (1996) ‘Ross-style Pluralism versus Rule-consequentialism’, Mind, 105: 531–52.

—— (2000) ‘Moral Particularism—Wrong and Bad’, in Hooker and Little (2000: 1–23).

—— and Little, M. (eds.) (2000) Moral Particularism (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

Horwich, P. (1998) Meaning (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

Humberstone, I. L. (1990) ‘Wanting, Getting, Having’, Philosophical Papers, 19: 99–118.

—— (1996) ‘Intrinsic/Extrinsic’, Synthese, 108: 205–67.

Hurka, T. (1998) ‘Two Kinds of Organic Unity’, Journal of Ethics, 2: 299–320.

Hurley, S. (1989) Natural Reasons: Personality and Polity (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

Hursthouse, R., Lawrence, G., and Quinn, W. (eds.) (1995) Virtues and Reasons: Essays in Honour of Philippa Foot (Oxford: Clarendon Press).

Irwin, T. H. (2000) ‘Ethics as an Inexact Science: Aristotle's Ambitions for Moral Theory’, in Hooker and Little (2000: 100–29).

Jackson, F. (1998) From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

—— Pettit, P., and Smith, M. (2000) ‘Ethical Particularism and Patterns’, in Hooker and Little (2000: 79–99).

Jonsen, A. R., and Toulmin, S. (1988) The Abuse of Casuistry: A History of Moral Reasoning (Berkeley: University of California Press).

Kagan, S. (1988) ‘The Additive Fallacy’, Ethics, 99: 5–31.

Keenan, J. F., and Shannon, T. A. (eds.) (1995) The Context of Casuistry (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press).

Korsgaard, C. (1983) ‘Two Distinctions in Goodness’, Philosophical Review, 92: 169–95; reprinted in Korsgaard (1996: 249–74).

(p.220) —— (1996) Creating the Kingdom of Ends (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Kripke, S. (1971) ‘Identity and Necessity’, in M. Munitz (ed.), Identity and Individuation (New York: New York University Press), 135–64.

—— (1982) Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press).

Lance, M., and Little, M. (forthcoming) ‘Mad Dogs and Englishmen: Moral Valence, Defeasibility, and Privileged Conditions’.

Langton, R. (forthcoming) ‘Values, Conditioned and Conferred’.

—— and Lewis, D. (1998) ‘Defining “Intrinsic” ’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 58: 333–45.

—— —— (2001) ‘Marshall and Parsons on “Intrinsic” ’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 63: 353–5.

Larmore, C., Patterns of Moral Complexity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Lemos, N. (1994) Intrinsic Value: Concept and Warrant (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Lewis, H. A. (1977) ‘Are Generalizations Incomprehensible?’, in D. Holdcroft (ed.), Papers on Logic and Language (University of Warwick publication), 32–54.

Little, M. (1994) ‘Moral Realism: Non-Naturalism’, Philosophical Books, 35: 225–32.

—— (1995) ‘Seeing and Caring: The Role of Affect in Feminist Moral Epistemology’, Hypatia, 10: 117–37.

—— (1997) ‘Virtue as Knowledge: Objections from the Philosophy of Mind’, Nous, 31: 59–79.

—— (2000) ‘Moral Generalities Revisited’, in Hooker and Little (2000: 276–304).

—— (2001) ‘Wittgensteinian Lessons on Particularism’, in C. Elliot (ed.), Slow Cures and Bad Philosophers: Essays on Wittgenstein, Medicine, and Bioethics (Durham, NC: Duke University Press), 161–80.

Loudon, R. B. (1991) ‘Aristotle's Practical Particularism’, in J. P. Anton and A. Preus (eds.), Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy, 4 (Albany, NY: SUNY Press).

—— (1992) Morality and Moral Theory (New York: Oxford University Press).

Lucas, J. R. (1955) ‘The Lesbian Rule’, Journal of Philosophy, 30: 195–213.

McDowell, J. (1978) ‘Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives?’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, suppl. vol. 52: 13–29; reprinted in McDowell (1998a: 77–94).

—— (1979) ‘Virtue and Reason’, The Monist, 62: 331–50; reprinted in McDowell (1998a: 50–73).

—— (1981) ‘Non-cognitivism and Rule-following’, in Holtzman and Leich (1981: 141–62); reprinted in McDowell (1998a: 198–218).

(p.221) McDowell, J. (1982) ‘Criteria, Defeasibility, and Knowledge’, Proceedings of the British Academy, 68: 455–79; reprinted in McDowell (1998b: 369–94, esp. p. 378).

—— (1998a) Mind, Value, and Reality (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press).

—— (1998b) Meaning, Knowledge, and Reality (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press).

MacIntyre, A. (1984) After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (London: Duckworth, 2nd edn., revised).

—— (1988) Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (London: Duckworth).

—— (1990) Three Rival Versions of Moral Inquiry: Encyclopaedia, Genealogy, and Tradition (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press).

McKeever, S., and Ridge, M. (forthcoming) ‘What does Holism have to do with Particularism?’, Ratio.

Mackie, J. L. (1977) Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (London: Penguin Books).

McNaughton, D. A. (1988) Moral Vision (Oxford: Blackwell).

—— (1996) ‘An Unconnected Heap of Duties?’, Philosophical Quarterly, 46: 433–47.

—— and Rawling, P. (2000) ‘Unprincipled Ethics’, in Hooker and Little (2000: 256–75).

Mill, J. S. (1861) Utilitarianism, ed. R. Crisp (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).

Millgram, E. (2002) ‘Murdoch, Practical Reasoning and Particularism’, Notizie di Politeia, 18: 64–87.

Mitchell, D. (1963) ‘Are Moral Principles Really Necessary?’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 41: 163–81.

Moore, G. E. (1903) Principia Ethica (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

—— (1922) ‘The Conception of Intrinsic Value’, in his Philosophical Studies (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul), 253–75.

—— (1942) ‘A Reply to my Critics’, in P. A. Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of G. E. Moore (New York: Tudor Publishing Co.), 535–687.

Murdoch, I. (1970) The Sovereignty of Good (Oxford: Blackwell), esp. 32–3, 44.

—— (1992) Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals (London: Chatto and Windus), esp. 302, 493.

Nagel, T. (1979) ‘Fragmentation of Value’, in his Mortal Questions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 128–41.

Norman, R. (1997) ‘Making Sense of Moral Realism’, Philosophical Investigations, 20: 117–35.

Nussbaum, M. (1986) The Fragility of Goodness (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

—— (1990) Love's Knowledge (New York: Oxford University Press).

—— (2000) ‘Why Practice Needs Ethical Theory: Particularism, Principle, and Bad Behaviour’, in Hooker and Little (2000: 227–55).

(p.222) O'Neill, O. (1996) Towards Justice and Virtue: A Reconstructive Account of Practical Reasoning (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

—— (2000) Bounds of Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), esp. 56–7.

Parfit, D. (1984) Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

—— (1997) ‘Reasons and Motivation’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, suppl. vol. 71: 99–130.

Prichard, H. A. (1912) ‘Does Moral Philosophy Rest Upon a Mistake?’, Mind, 21: 21–37; reprinted in Prichard (1968: 1–17).

—— (1928) ‘Duty and Interest’, in Prichard (1968: 201–38).

—— (1968) Moral Obligation, ed. J. O. Urmson (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

—— (2002) Moral Writings, ed. J. MacAdam (Oxford: Clarendon Press).

Quinn, W. (1993a) ‘Putting Rationality in Its Place’, in R. Frey and C. Morris (eds.), Value, Welfare and Morality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press); reprinted in Quinn (1993b: 228–55) and in Hursthouse et al. (1995: 181–208).

—— (1993b) Morality and Action (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Rachels, J. (1993) The Elements of Moral Philosophy (New York: Harper Collins).

Rawls, J. (1971) A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press).

Raz, J. (1986) The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press).

—— (1998) ‘Incommensurability and Agency’, in Chang (1998: 110–28).

—— (2000a) Engaging Reason (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).

—— (2000b) ‘The Central Conflict: Morality and Self-interest’, in Raz (2000a: 303–32); reprinted in R. Crisp and B. Hooker (eds.), Well-Being and Morality: Essays in Honour of James Griffin (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000), 209–38.

—— (2000c) ‘The Truth in Particularism’, in Raz (2000a: 218–46); reprinted in Hooker and Little (2000: 48–78). In the text, page references are given to both printings of this paper.

Richardson, H. S. (1990) ‘Specifying Norms as a Way to Resolve Concrete Ethical Problems’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 19: 279–310.

—— (2000) ‘Balancing and Interpreting Bioethical Principles’, Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, 25: 285–307.

Ross, W. D. (1927) ‘The Basis of Objective Judgments in Ethics’, International Journal of Ethics, 37/2: 113–27.

—— (1930) The Right and the Good (Oxford: Clarendon Press).

—— (1939) Foundations of Ethics (Oxford: Clarendon Press).

Sandel, M. (1982) Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Sayre-McCord, G. (1996) ‘Coherentist Epistemology and Moral Theory’, in Sinnott-Armstrong and Timmons (1996: 137–89).

(p.223) Scanlon, T. M. (1998) What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press).

—— (2000) ‘Intention and Permissibility’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, suppl. vol. 74: 301–17.

Schauer, F. (1991) Playing by the Rules: A Philosophical Examination of Rule-Based Decision-Making in Law and in Life (Oxford: Clarendon Press).

Scheffler, S. (1987) ‘Morality through Thick and Thin’, Philosophical Review, 96: 411–34; reprinted in his Boundaries and Allegiances (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 197–215.

Schueler, G. F. (2003) Reasons and Purposes (Oxford: Clarendon Press).

Sellars, W. (1956) ‘Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind’, in H. Feigl and M. Scriven (eds.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 1 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press), 255–329.

Shafer-Landau, R. (1997) ‘Moral Rules’, Ethics, 107: 584–611.

Sherman, N. (1996) Making a Necessity of Virtue (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Sidgwick, H. (1907) The Methods of Ethics, 7th edn. (London: Macmillan).

Sinnott-Armstrong, W. (1999) ‘Some Varieties of Particularism’, Metaphilosophy, 30: 1–12.

—— and Timmons, M. (eds.) (1996) Moral Knowledge? (New York: Oxford University Press).

Smith, Adam (1790) The Theory of Moral Sentiments, 6th edn. (London and Edinburgh); esp. Part 3, chs. 4–6.

Smith, M. (1994) The Moral Problem (Oxford: Blackwell).

Stocker, M. (1990) Plural and Conflicting Values (Oxford: Clarendon Press).

Stoneham, T. (1999) ‘Logical Form and Thought Content’, Analysis, 59: 183–5.

Stratton-Lake, P. J. (1997) ‘Can Hooker's Rule-consequentialist Principle Justify Rossian Prima Facie Duties?’, Mind, 106: 751–8.

—— (2000) Kant, Duty, and Moral Worth (London: Routledge).

—— (ed.) (2002) Re-evaluating Ethical Intuitionism (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

Tännsjö, T. (1995) ‘In Defence of Theory in Ethics’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 25: 571–94.

Temkin, L. (1997) ‘Rethinking the Good’, in J. Dancy (ed.), Reading Parfit (Oxford: Blackwell), 290–345.

Thesiger, W. (1959) Arabian Sands (London: Longmans).

Thompson, M. (1995) ‘The Representation of Life’, in Hursthouse et al. (1995: 247–96).

Timmons, M. (2002) Moral Theory: An Introduction (Rowman and Littlefield).

Travis, C. (2000) Unshadowed Thought (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press).

Walker, M. U. (1997) Moral Understandings (London: Routledge, 1997).

(p.224) Wallace, J. D. (1988) Moral Relevance and Moral Conflict (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press)

—— (1996) Ethical Norms, Particular Cases (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press).

Wallace, R. J., Pettit, P., Scheffler, S., and Smith, M. (eds.) (2004) Reason and Value: Themes from the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz (Oxford: Clarendon Press).

White, A. R. (1972) ‘What We Believe’, in N. Rescher (ed.), Studies in the Philosophy of Mind, APQ monograph series no. 6 (Oxford: Blackwell), 69–84.

Wiggins, D. (1976a) ‘Deliberation and Practical Reason’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 76: 29–51; reprinted in Wiggins (1987: 215–37).

—— (1976b) ‘Truth, Invention and the Meaning of Life’, Proceedings of the British Academy, 62: 331–78; reprinted in Wiggins (1987: 87–137).

—— (1987) Needs, Values, Truth (Oxford, Blackwell).

—— (1997) ‘Incommensurability: Four Proposals’, in Chang (1998: 52–66).

Williams, B. A. O. (1979) ‘Conflicts of Value’, in A. Ryan (ed.), The Idea of Freedom: Essays in Honour of Isaiah Berlin (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 221–32; reprinted in Williams (1981: 71–82).

—— (1981) Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers 1973–1980 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

—— (1985) Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press).

—— (1988) ‘What Does Intuitionism Imply?’, in J. Dancy, J. Moravscik, and C. C. W. Taylor (eds.), Human Agency: Essays for J. O. Urmson (Palo Alto, Calif.: Stanford University Press); reprinted in Williams (1995b: 182–91).

—— (1995a) ‘Acts and Omissions, Doing and Not Doing’, in R. Hursthouse, G. Lawrence, and W. Quinn (1995: 331–40, esp. 332–3); reprinted in Williams (1995b: 56–64, esp. 57).

—— (1995b) Making Sense of Humanity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

—— (2002) Truth and Truthfulness (Princeton: Princeton University Press).

Winch, P. (1965) ‘The Universalizability of Moral Judgements’, in his Ethics and Action (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972), 151–70.

Wittgenstein, L. (1953) Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: Blackwell).

Woods, M. J. (1986) ‘Intuition and Perception in Aristotle's Ethics’, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 4: 145–66.