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Bayesian Epistemology
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Bayesian Epistemology

Luc Bovens and Stephan Hartmann

Abstract

Probabilistic models have much to offer to epistemology and philosophy of science. Arguably, the coherence theory of justification claims that the more coherent a set of propositions is, the more confident one ought to be in its content, ceteris paribus. An impossibility result shows that there cannot exist a coherence ordering. A coherence quasi-ordering can be constructed that respects this claim and is relevant to scientific-theory choice. Bayesian-Network models of the reliability of information sources are made applicable to Condorcet-style jury voting, Tversky and Kahneman’s Linda puzzle ... More

Keywords: Bayesian Networks, coherence measures, coherence theory of justification, Condorcet Jury Theorem, Duhem–Quine thesis, evidence, Linda puzzle, probabilistic models, reliability, scientific-theory choice, testimony, Tversky and Kahneman, variety-of-evidence thesis

Bibliographic Information

Print publication date: 2004 Print ISBN-13: 9780199269754
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2005 DOI:10.1093/0199269750.001.0001

Authors

Affiliations are at time of print publication.

Luc Bovens, author
Department of Philosophy, University of Colorado at Boulder
Author Webpage

Stephan Hartmann, author
London School of Economics
Author Webpage

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