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The Politics of Public Service BargainsReward, Competency, Loyalty - and Blame$

Christopher Hood and Martin Lodge

Print publication date: 2006

Print ISBN-13: 9780199269679

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2006

DOI: 10.1093/019926967X.001.0001

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(p.207) References

(p.207) References

Source:
The Politics of Public Service Bargains
Publisher:
Oxford University Press

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