This book is organised around an epistemological puzzle, which consists of a tension between various ordinary claims to know and our apparent incapacity to know whether or not someone will lose a lottery. In its starkest form, the puzzle is this: we do not think we know that a given lottery ticket will be a loser, yet we normally count ourselves as knowing all sorts of ordinary things which entail that its holder will not suddenly acquire a large fortune. The author explores various potential solutions to this puzzle, and issues on the nature and importance of knowledge. In the process, he off ... More

This book is organised around an epistemological puzzle, which consists of a tension between various ordinary claims to know and our apparent incapacity to know whether or not someone will lose a lottery. In its starkest form, the puzzle is this: we do not think we know that a given lottery ticket will be a loser, yet we normally count ourselves as knowing all sorts of ordinary things which entail that its holder will not suddenly acquire a large fortune. The author explores various potential solutions to this puzzle, and issues on the nature and importance of knowledge. In the process, he offers a careful treatment of pertinent topics at the foundations of semantics.