Classic Objections to Hedonism
Seven classic objections to hedonism are presented and explained. Each is carefully formulated as an objection to the Default Hedonism introduced in Ch. 2. The objections are based on (a) the idea that some pleasures are base, disgusting, and worthless; (b) the concept of ‘false pleasures’; (c) the alleged worthlessness of pleasure without knowledge; (d) difficulties in the measurement of pleasure and pain; (e) the idea that we can imagine a good life in which there is no pleasure; (f) the idea that the value of some worlds might be directly affected by such things as beauty or ugliness even when these factors have no bearing on the amounts of pleasure and pain in those worlds; and (g) the idea that the value of a world might be affected by the justice or injustice of the distribution of pleasure and pain in that world even though the total amounts of pleasure and pain are not affected.
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