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Epistemology after Protagoras$
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Mi-Kyoung Lee

Print publication date: 2005

Print ISBN-13: 9780199262229

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2005

DOI: 10.1093/0199262225.001.0001

Introduction

Chapter:
(p. 1 ) 1 Introduction
Source:
Epistemology after Protagoras
Author(s):

Mi-Kyoung Lee (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0199262225.003.0001

This book starts from the question: did skepticism only arise in the Hellenistic era? It is argued that skepticism was in the air even earlier in the classical period — not in the form of a well-defined school of thought or position, but in the form of certain loosely-related ideas and arguments. Some of these were articulated by Protagoras in his book Alêtheia ‘Truth’, which began with the striking claim that ‘Man is the measure of all things, of what is that it is, of what is not that it is not.’ Protagoras’ claim posed a challenge to the ideals of expert knowledge, truth, and to the privileged role of reason in discovering the truth. Plato, Aristotle, and Democritus responded to this challenge in their work.

Keywords:   skepticism, truth, measure, expert knowledge, reason

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