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Foundations of Human SocialityEconomic Experiments and Ethnographic Evidence from Fifteen Small-Scale Societies$

Joseph Henrich, Robert Boyd, Samuel Bowles, Colin Camerer, Ernst Fehr, and Herbert Gintis

Print publication date: 2004

Print ISBN-13: 9780199262052

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2005

DOI: 10.1093/0199262055.001.0001

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(p.ix) List of Figures

(p.ix) List of Figures

Source:
Foundations of Human Sociality
Publisher:
Oxford University Press

  1. 2.1 Locations of the societies mentioned in the text 13

  2. 2.2 A Bubble Plot showing the distribution of Ultimatum Game offers for each group 19

  3. 2.3 Summary of Ultimatum Game responders' behavior 21

  4. 2.4 The observed mean Ultimatum Game offer in various groups plotted against the expected Income-Maximizing offer estimated from observed distribution of rejections 25

  5. 2.5 Partial regression plots of mean Ultimatum Game offer as a function of indexes of Payoffs to Cooperation and Market Integration 32

  6. 3.1 Prisoner's Dilemma 64

  7. 3.2 Average contributions over time in Public Goods Game with a constant group composition 67

  8. 3.3 Offers and rejections in $10 and $100 Ultimatum Games 70

  9. 3.4 Distribution of ultimatum offers 71

  10. 3.5 Dictator Game allocations 73

  11. 3.6 Effort–wage relation in the gift exchange game 76

  12. 3.7 Representation of Prisoner's Dilemma in terms of material payoffs 81

  13. 3.8 Utility representation of Prisoner's Dilemma in Figure 3.7 81

  14. 3.9 The ‘stag hunt’ or assurance game 87

  15. 3.10 Battle of the Sexes Game 88

  16. 4.1 Location of Conambo 99

  17. 4.2 Ethnic and political distribution of households in Conambo in 1998 103

  18. 4.3 Ultimatum Game offers, Conambo 1998 108

  19. 4.4 Correlation between proposer's average alliance strengths and their offers 110

  20. 4.5 Ultimatum Game offers by coalition 110

  21. 4.6 Correlation between proposer's average alliance strengths and their offers by coalition 111

  22. (p.x) 4.7 The number of households a man gives to by his status 115

  23. 4.8 The number of households Achuar men give to by their status 116

  24. 4.9 The number of households Quichua men give to by their status 116

  25. 4.10 Achuar men's ratio of giving to receiving by their status 117

  26. 4.11 Quichua men's ratio of giving to receiving by their status 118

  27. 5.1 Distribution of offers in the UG with Machiguenga and Pittsburgh 133

  28. 5.2 Distribution of withdrawals in the CPR game with Machiguenga and Americans 149

  29. 5.3 Distribution of withdrawals in the Machiguenga CPR game in Private condition and Public condition 150

  30. 5.4 Distribution of contributions in the VC game with the Mapuche and Huinca player 156

  31. 6.1 University of California, Los Angeles Ultimatum Game offers 176

  32. 6.2 Hadza Ultimatum Game offers 177

  33. 6.3 Modal Ultimatum Game offers for all fifteen small-scale societies 177

  34. 6.4 Hadza Ultimatum Game rejections by offer 178

  35. 6.5 Hadza Ultimatum Game offers by population 179

  36. 6.6 Hadza Ultimatum Game offers by gender by population 180

  37. 6.7 Hadza Ultimatum Game earnings by role and population 181

  38. 6.8 Hadza Ultimatum Game offers in the four smallest camps 182

  39. 6.9 Hadza Ultimatum Game offers in the one largest camp 182

  40. 6.10 Hadza rejections of Ultimatum Game offers of ≤20%, big versus smaller camps 183

  41. 6.11 Ultimatum Game risk avoidance in sixteen societies 184

  42. 6.12 Payoffs to Hadza Ultimatum Game proposers 184

  43. 6.13 Hadza Dictator Game offers 185

  44. 6.14 Hadza Dictator Game offers by population 186

  45. 6.15 Hadza Dictator Game offers by population by gender 186

  46. (p.xi) 7.1 Frequency distributions of offers in Ultimatum Game 206

  47. 7.2 Frequency distributions of Public Goods Game contributions 207

  48. 7.3 Ultimatum Game results by market context and village 208

  49. 7.4 Public goods contribution in Public Goods Game by, (a) distance to San Borja and (b) village 209

  50. 7.5 Spanish-speaking ability and (a) Ultimatum Game, and (b) Public Goods Game behavior 211

  51. 7.6 Visits to San Borja and (a) Ultimatum Game, and (b) Public Goods Game behavior 212

  52. 7.7 Formal education and (a) Ultimatum Game, and (b) Public Goods Game behavior 213

  53. 7.8 Days worked outside village and (a) Ultimatum Game, and (b) Public Goods Game behavior 214

  54. 7.9 Age and sex for (a) Ultimatum Game, and (b) Public Goods Game behavior 215

  55. 7.10 Ultimatum Game and Public Goods Game behavior 223

  56. 8.1 Highest grade completed among participants at Anguganak and Bogasip 241

  57. 8.2 Distribution of accepted and rejected offers at Anguganak and Bogasip combined 246

  58. 8.3 Distribution of accepted and rejected offers at Anguganak 246

  59. 8.4 Distribution of accepted and rejected offers at Bogasip 247

  60. 8.5 Pairwise comparison of acceptance rates at Anguganak and Bogasip 247

  61. 8.6 Distribution of offers by gender in Anguganak and Bogasip combined 248

  62. 8.7 Pairwise comparison of acceptance rates by gender 249

  63. 8.8 Distribution of offers by number of cocoa gardens 250

  64. 9.1 Distribution of offers in Study 1 271

  65. 9.2 Structure of offers and responses 275

  66. 9.3 Combined Kazakh and Torguud in-group offers in Study 2 279

  67. 9.4 Combined Kazakh and Torguud out-group offers in Study 2 280

  68. (p.xii) 9.5 Individual in/out-group offers 280

  69. 10.1 Distribution of investments in the TG in resettled and non-resettled villages 307

  70. 10.2 Distribution of proportional responses in the TG in resettled and non-resettled villages 308

  71. 10.3 Distribution of offers in the Ultimatum Game in resettled and non-resettled villages 308

  72. 10.4 Offers and rejections in the Ultimatum Game in (a) resettled villages, (b) non-resettled villages, (c) rejection rates as a function of offer size in the Ultimatum Game in resettled and non-resettled villages (stake size S=50 Zim$) 309

  73. 11.1 Distributions of offers and rejections for both communities: (a) farmers in Utengule area and (b) herders in Ukwaheri area 341

  74. 11.2 Proportions of offers rejected at each offer amount, for farmer and herder communities 342

  75. 11.3 Maximum likelihood rejection functions for independent farmer and herder data 346

  76. 11.4 Maximum likelihood rejection functions for independent farmer and herder data 347

  77. 12.1 Distribution of offers in the Ultimatum Game 371

  78. 12.2 Distribution of offers in the Dictator Game 373

  79. 12.3 Distribution of offers in the four-person Public Goods Game 375

  80. 12.4 Distribution of offers in the Ultimatum Game by no wage/trade income and positive wage income, stake size = 100 Kenyan shillings 378

  81. 12.5 Distribution of offers in the Dictator Game by no wage/trade income and positive wage income, stake size = 100 Kenyan shillings 379

  82. 13.1 Frequency distribution of offers by first-time players in the Ultimatum Game played anonymously and in public 396

  83. 13.2 Frequency distribution of contributions to the PGG played anonymously and in public 398

  84. 13.3 The relationship between offers made by single individuals in the Ultimatum Game and their (p.xiii) contributions in the PGG played (a) anonymously, or in (b) public 400

  85. 13.4 The relationship between the measured discount rate for individuals and their offers in the (a) Ultimatum Game, or (b) their contribution to the Public Goods Game. Discount rates as defined in the text are low (1), medium (2), and high (3) 401

  86. 14.1 Distribution of offers in the Ultimatum Game 419

  87. 14.2 Rejection rates as a function of offer size in the Ultimatum Game 420