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Nondescriptive Meaning and ReferenceAn Ideational Semantics$
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Wayne A. Davis

Print publication date: 2005

Print ISBN-13: 9780199261659

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: February 2006

DOI: 10.1093/0199261652.001.0001

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Reference and Intention

Reference and Intention

Chapter:
(p.173) 8 Reference and Intention
Source:
Nondescriptive Meaning and Reference
Author(s):

Wayne A. Davis (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0199261652.003.0008

This chapter shows that the intentionalist definition of reference presented in chapter 7 is superior to alternative analyses. It defends the implication that speakers can refer to non-existent objects, arguing for the intentionality of speaker reference and against the wide-spread assumption that it is a relation. It enumerates many defects in the theory that reference is a species of causal relation, and defends the thesis that speaker reference is determined by intention against twin earth arguments.

Keywords:   intentionality, causal theories, introspective knowledge, brain-in-vat argument, thinking of objects, twin earth argument

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