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The Economics and Politics of AccountingInternational Perspectives on Trends, Policy, and Practice$
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Christian Leuz, Dieter Pfaff, and Anthony Hopwood

Print publication date: 2004

Print ISBN-13: 9780199260621

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2005

DOI: 10.1093/0199260621.001.0001

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Constituent Lobbying and Its Impact on the Development of Financial Reporting Regulations: Evidence from Germany

Constituent Lobbying and Its Impact on the Development of Financial Reporting Regulations: Evidence from Germany

Chapter:
(p.285) CHAPTER 5.2 Constituent Lobbying and Its Impact on the Development of Financial Reporting Regulations: Evidence from Germany
Source:
The Economics and Politics of Accounting
Author(s):

Stuart McLeay

Dieter Ordelheide

Steven Young

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0199260621.003.0012

An examination is made of the impact of constituent lobbying activity on accounting regulators during the transformation of the Fourth European Company Law Directive into German accounting law. Using detailed published commentaries prepared by representative organizations on draft accounting legislation, evidence is provided concerning the preferences of the three primary German accounting constituencies – industry preparers, auditors, and academic experts. Initially, a model that merely distinguishes between the three constituencies suggests that the industry lobby group representing preparers exerts the greatest influence on the decisions of the German legislature. However, when the empirical model is extended to include all two-way interaction effects, the relative power of preparers is seen to be far lower, with the influence exerted by industry depending crucially on the support of at least one of the remaining lobby groups.

Keywords:   academic experts, accounting, accounting law, accounting regulations, auditors, constituent lobbying, financial reporting, financial reporting regulations, German accounting law, Germany, industry lobby group, lobby groups, lobbying

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