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Moral RealismA Defence$
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Russ Shafer-Landau

Print publication date: 2003

Print ISBN-13: 9780199259755

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2005

DOI: 10.1093/0199259755.001.0001

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Motivational Judgement Internalism

Motivational Judgement Internalism

Chapter:
(p.142) Motivational Judgement Internalism 6
Source:
Moral Realism
Author(s):

Russ Shafer-Landau (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0199259455.003.0007

Presents a taxonomy of internalisms, considers the amoralist as a counter‐example to motivational judgement internalism, provides the author's own examples to bolster the prospect of genuine amoralism, and tries to defuse the two primary worries about the author's form of motivational externalism.

Keywords:   amoralist, internalism, judgement internalism, motivational externalism

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