There exist such things as the things we mean and believe, and they are what the book calls pleonastic propositions. The book is about what these propositions are in themselves, and about their place in nature, language, and thought. Chapters 1 and 2 advance the theory of pleonastic propositions, and of pleonastic entities generally. The remaining six chapters bring that theory to bear on issues in the theory of content: the existence and nature of meanings; knowledge of meaning; the relation between content-involving facts and underlying physical facts; vagueness and indeterminacy; conditiona ... More

There exist such things as the things we mean and believe, and they are what the book calls pleonastic propositions. The book is about what these propositions are in themselves, and about their place in nature, language, and thought. Chapters 1 and 2 advance the theory of pleonastic propositions, and of pleonastic entities generally. The remaining six chapters bring that theory to bear on issues in the theory of content: the existence and nature of meanings; knowledge of meaning; the relation between content-involving facts and underlying physical facts; vagueness and indeterminacy; conditionals; normative discourse; and the role of pleonastic propositions in explanation, prediction, and knowledge acquisition.