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Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality$
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Sarah Stroud and Christine Tappolet

Print publication date: 2003

Print ISBN-13: 9780199257362

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2005

DOI: 10.1093/0199257361.001.0001

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Choosing Rationally and Choosing Correctly

Choosing Rationally and Choosing Correctly

Chapter:
(p.201) 8 Choosing Rationally and Choosing Correctly
Source:
Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality
Author(s):

Ralph Wedgwood (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0199257361.003.0009

Argues that internal requirements on rational choice are derived from the ultimate practical ‘aim’ of arriving at correct choices, which depend on which of one's options really are good things to do. In order to defend this ‘recognitional’ view of practical reason against the ‘constructivist’ who sees the internal, procedural requirements on rational choice as fundamental, the author argues that the objections which constructivists have raised against the recognitional view in fact apply only to substantive and not to formal versions of the latter. Furthermore, the author urges, objections of the very same kind can be pressed against the constructivist view itself.

Keywords:   choice, constructivism, good, instrumental reasoning, Christine Korsgaard, practical reason, rationality, recognitional view

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