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Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality$
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Sarah Stroud and Christine Tappolet

Print publication date: 2003

Print ISBN-13: 9780199257362

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2005

DOI: 10.1093/0199257361.001.0001

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How is Strength of Will Possible?

How is Strength of Will Possible?

Chapter:
(p.39) 2 How is Strength of Will Possible?
Source:
Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality
Author(s):

Richard Holton (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0199257361.003.0003

Most recent accounts of will power have tried to explain it as reducible to the operation of beliefs and desires. In opposition to such accounts, this essay argues for a distinct faculty of will power. Considerations from philosophy and from social psychology are used in support.

Keywords:   akrasia, intentions, motivation, Humean theory of resolution, strength of will, temptation, weakness of will, will, will power

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