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Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality
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Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality

Sarah Stroud and Christine Tappolet

Abstract

Among the many practical failures that threaten us, weakness of will or akrasia is often considered to be a paradigm of irrationality. The eleven new essays in this collection give a rich overview of the current debate over weakness of will and practical irrationality more generally. Issues covered include classical questions such as the distinction between weakness of will and compulsion, the connection between evaluative judgement and motivation, the role of emotions in akrasia, rational agency, and the existence of the will. They also include new topics, such as group akrasia, strength of w ... More

Keywords: akrasia, desires, emotions, evaluation, internalism, irrationality, practical reason, reasons, weakness of will, will

Bibliographic Information

Print publication date: 2003 Print ISBN-13: 9780199257362
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2005 DOI:10.1093/0199257361.001.0001

Authors

Affiliations are at time of print publication.

Sarah Stroud, editor
Department of Philosophy, McGill University, Canada
Author Webpage

Christine Tappolet, editor
Department of Philosophy, University of Montreal, Canada
Author Webpage