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EvidentialismEssays in Epistemology$
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Earl Conee and Richard Feldman

Print publication date: 2004

Print ISBN-13: 9780199253722

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: August 2004

DOI: 10.1093/0199253722.001.0001

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Making Sense of Skepticism

Making Sense of Skepticism

Chapter:
(p.277) 12 Making Sense of Skepticism
Source:
Evidentialism
Author(s):

Richard Feldman (Contributor Webpage)

Earl Conee (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0199253722.003.0013

Criticizes non‐evidentialist theories of knowledge as they bear on external world skeptical arguments. The theories are held to provide no good way to understand the intuitive appeal of the arguments for skepticism. An evidentialist characterization is offered of the justification that is needed for knowledge. On the basis of this characterization, an account is given of the appeal of the skeptical arguments. The characterization also provides a basis to object to the arguments.

Keywords:   brains in vats, causal theory, closure, criminal standard of justification, justification, knowledge, possibility of error, reliabilism, skepticism, truth tracking

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