Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Aristotle's Theory of SubstanceThe Categories and Metaphysics Zeta$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Michael V. Wedin

Print publication date: 2002

Print ISBN-13: 9780199253081

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0199253080.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2018. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy).date: 22 October 2018

Nonsubstantial Individuals

Nonsubstantial Individuals

Chapter:
(p.38) II Nonsubstantial Individuals
Source:
Aristotle's Theory of Substance
Author(s):

Michael V. Wedin (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0199253080.003.0003

Wedin addresses the debate over whether nonsubstantial individuals, that inhere in a subject but are not said of a subject, i.e. accidents, such as the pallor of Socrates, are nonrecurring particulars or a kind of determinate universal. Wedin examines the secondary literature on this topic and divides it into two schools of thought, determined by the contributions of J.L. Ackrill and G.E.L. Owen. According to Ackrill, individuals in non‐substance categories are particular to the substance they are in; Owen critiques Ackrill's view, and proposes that these items can recur in more than one subject and hence are a sort of universal. Wedin finds Owen's thesis unsatisfactory, even after supplementing it with an improved version due to Michael Frede; instead, Wedin argues for a revised version of Ackrill's interpretation of nonsubstantial individuals as nonrecurrent particulars. According to Wedin, Aristotle is committed to individuals only—e.g. to Socrates and to the particular bit of pallor in him: this conclusion has an important bearing on the ontological status of individuals and on the primacy of substance to nonsubstantial items.

Keywords:   accidents, J.L. Ackrill, Michael Frede, inhere, nonrecurrent particulars, nonsubstantial individuals, ontological status of individuals, G.E.L. Owen, said of, universal

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .