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Aristotle's Theory of Substance
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Aristotle's Theory of Substance: The Categories and Metaphysics Zeta

Michael V. Wedin

Abstract

The Categories and Metaphysics Zeta (Book VII) are often thought to be incompatible because each posits different candidates for the title of primary substance or ousia. In the Categories, primary substance is the concrete individual thing, while in Zeta, it is the form or essence of the individual thing, which is now understood as a composite of form and matter. In this book, Wedin rejects the thesis of incompatibilism, and in its stead argues that the two treatises are concerned with different projects. Wedin argues that the theory of Metaphysics Zeta is meant to explain certain features of ... More

Keywords: Aristotle's theory of substance, Categories, composite, c‐substance, essence, explanatory primacy, form, incompatibilism, matter, Metaphysics Zeta, ontological priority, ousia, primary substance, the subject of predications, the substance‐of substance

Bibliographic Information

Print publication date: 2002 Print ISBN-13: 9780199253081
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003 DOI:10.1093/0199253080.001.0001

Authors

Affiliations are at time of print publication.

Michael V. Wedin, author
University of California, Davis
Author Webpage

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