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Causing Actions$
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Paul M. Pietroski

Print publication date: 2002

Print ISBN-13: 9780199252763

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0199252769.001.0001

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Natural Causes

Natural Causes

Chapter:
(p.216) 7 Natural Causes
Source:
Causing Actions
Author(s):

Paul M. Pietroski (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0199252769.003.0008

The proposed account of causation, in terms of explanation, does not sleight the mind‐independence of causal relations. The relevant notion of explanation is objective, even if facts are taken to be abstract Fregean ‘modes of presenting’ (or ‘ways of thinking about’) events. Causation remains a natural, and often perceptible relation between spatiotemporal particulars. But we must resist empiricist conceptions of causation.

Keywords:   causation, empiricism, events, explanation, facts, Frege, mind‐dependence, mode of presentation, objectivity, Strawson

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