Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Causing Actions$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Paul M. Pietroski

Print publication date: 2002

Print ISBN-13: 9780199252763

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0199252769.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2019. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy).date: 20 March 2019

Actions as Inner Causes

Actions as Inner Causes

(p.18) 1 Actions as Inner Causes
Causing Actions

Paul M. Pietroski (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

Actions are mental events (tryings, volitions) that typically cause bodily motions. This is strongly suggested by the semantics of causative constructions, like ‘She raised her hand’, which require event analyses (and appeal to thematic roles). Objections to this view can be rebutted, while a range of intuitions about the individuation of actions are preserved, given the right conception of actions and action sentences.

Keywords:   actions, causation, causatives, causes, event analysis, events, individuation, thematic roles, tryings, volition

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .