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Plato's Utopia RecastHis Later Ethics and Politics$
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Christopher Bobonich

Print publication date: 2002

Print ISBN-13: 9780199251438

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0199251436.001.0001

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Parts of the Soul and the Psychology of Virtue

Parts of the Soul and the Psychology of Virtue

Chapter:
(p.216) 3 Parts of the Soul and the Psychology of Virtue
Source:
Plato's Utopia Recast
Author(s):

Christopher Bobonich (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0199251436.003.0003

Plato's psychology in the Phaedo and the Republic is committed to a partitioning thesis that partitions the individual human being into a compound of distinct agent‐like parts. This chapter argues that the Laws abandons the Republic's theory of parts of the soul. I examine the Laws’ new theory of akrasia (weakness of will) and some of the implications of the Laws’ new psychology for broader issues in Plato's ethics.

Keywords:   akrasia, Laws, partitioning, psychic intervention, Republic, soul, strong and weak akrasia

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