Argues that Plato in his middle period (roughly at the time of the Phaedo and the Republic) had a radically pessimistic view of non‐philosophers: they could not be genuinely virtuous or happy, and their lives were inevitably deeply undesirable ones to live. This pessimistic conclusion, I argue, rests on Plato's middle‐period epistemology, psychology, and metaphysics. But in the later dialogues (e.g. the Laws and the Statesman), Plato comes to a strikingly different conclusion. At least some non‐philosophers can be virtuous and lead lives that are well worth living. This book traces and explore ... More

Argues that Plato in his middle period (roughly at the time of the Phaedo and the Republic) had a radically pessimistic view of non‐philosophers: they could not be genuinely virtuous or happy, and their lives were inevitably deeply undesirable ones to live. This pessimistic conclusion, I argue, rests on Plato's middle‐period epistemology, psychology, and metaphysics. But in the later dialogues (e.g. the Laws and the Statesman), Plato comes to a strikingly different conclusion. At least some non‐philosophers can be virtuous and lead lives that are well worth living. This book traces and explores the backward and forward connections to Plato's new estimate of non‐philosophers’ ethical capacities. On the backward side, these changes rest on significant developments in Plato's psychology and epistemology. In particular, in Plato's late period, he develops a more unified view of the soul's capacities and a richer understanding of how reason structures and influences the rest of the soul's capacities. On the forward side, these differences in non‐philosophers’ ethical capacities have significant implications for Plato's political philosophy. Since non‐philosophers are capable of more, the political and social institutions appropriate for them must also be differ ent.