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Donald DavidsonMeaning, Truth, Language, and Reality$
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Ernie Lepore and Kirk Ludwig

Print publication date: 2005

Print ISBN-13: 9780199251346

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: July 2005

DOI: 10.1093/0199251347.001.0001

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Foster's Objection

Foster's Objection

Chapter:
(p.113) 8 Foster's Objection
Source:
Donald Davidson
Author(s):

Ernie Lepore (Contributor Webpage)

Kirk Ludwig (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0199251347.003.0008

Takes up Foster’s Objection to truth-theoretic semantics, namely, that a merely true truth theory cannot serve as a meaning theory, and that no further constraint on it is compatible with Davidson’s own constraints on an adequate solution to the problem. Argues that the problem is illusory, and that although it is true that extensional adequacy is not enough, the solution to the problem does not violate any constraints that Davidson places on the project.

Keywords:   constraints on a truth theory, Foster’s objection

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