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Donald DavidsonMeaning, Truth, Language, and Reality$

Ernie Lepore and Kirk Ludwig

Print publication date: 2005

Print ISBN-13: 9780199251346

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: July 2005

DOI: 10.1093/0199251347.001.0001

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(p.425) Bibliography

(p.425) Bibliography

Source:
Donald Davidson
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Oxford University Press

Bibliography references:

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