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From a Deflationary Point of View$
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Paul Horwich

Print publication date: 2005

Print ISBN-13: 9780199251261

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: April 2005

DOI: 10.1093/0199251266.001.0001

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Meaning, Use, and Truth

Meaning, Use, and Truth

On Whether a Use-Theory of Meaning is Precluded by the Requirement that Whatever Constitutes the Meaning of a Predicate Be Capable of Determining the Set of Things of Which the Predicate is True and to Which it Ought to be Applied

Chapter:
(p.67) 4 Meaning, Use, and Truth
Source:
From a Deflationary Point of View
Author(s):

Paul Horwich (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0199251266.003.0005

This essay defends Wittgenstein’s ‘use-theory’ of meaning against Kripke’s critique of ‘dispositionalism.’ It reviews the distinction between two conceptions of truth: the traditional view and the deflationary view. It examines Kripke’s argument against the reduction of meaning-facts to facts about dispositions of use. It then shows that Kripke’s argument can be saved by a fallacy of equivocation only by presupposing an inflationary conception of truth.

Keywords:   use-theory of meaning, dispositionalism, Wittgenstein, Kripke, truth

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