Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
From a Deflationary Point of View$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Paul Horwich

Print publication date: 2005

Print ISBN-13: 9780199251261

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: April 2005

DOI: 10.1093/0199251266.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2018. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy).date: 21 September 2018

Realism and Truth

Realism and Truth

Chapter:
(p.32) 2 Realism and Truth
Source:
From a Deflationary Point of View
Author(s):

Paul Horwich (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0199251266.003.0003

This essay argues that the problems of truth and realism are independent of one another. Impressions to the contrary stem from the fact that realist and anti-realist positions must be formulated with the notion of truth. However, such formulations merely confirm the epistemologically and metaphysically neutral, deflationary theory, since they rest on the generalising function of the truth-predicare.

Keywords:   truth, realism, anti-realism, deflationary theory, contrary impressions, truth-predicare

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .