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From a Deflationary Point of View$
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From a Deflationary Point of View

Paul Horwich

Print publication date: 2005

Print ISBN-13: 9780199251261

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: April 2005

DOI: 10.1093/0199251266.001.0001

Wittgenstein's Meta-philosophical Development

Chapter:
(p. 159 ) 10 Wittgenstein's Meta-philosophical Development
Source:
From a Deflationary Point of View
Author(s):

Paul Horwich (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0199251266.003.0011

This essay opposes the claim that Wittgenstein provided two distinct and contradictory philosophies on meaning in his ‘Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus’ (1922) and ‘Philosophical Investigations’ (1953). It is argued that basis of Wittgenstein’s thought was his view of what ‘philosophy’ is rather than what ‘meaning’ is. From this perspective, the defect in the Tractatus can be observed as a small incoherence within its meta-philosophy, and the central ideas of the investigations emerge when this mistake is rectified.

Keywords:   Wittgenstein, philosophy, meaning

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